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Economic theory suggests that payday lending can either 
increase or decrease consumer welfare. Consumers can use payday 
loans to cushion the effects of financial shocks, but payday loans may 
also increase the chance that consumers will succumb to temptation 
or cognitive errors and seek instant gratification. Both supporters 
and critics of payday lending have alleged that the welfare effects of 
the industry can be substantial and that the legalization of payday 
lending can even have measurable effects on proxies for financial 
distress, such as bankruptcy, foreclosure, and property crime. Critics 
further allege that payday lenders target minority and military 
communities, making these groups especially vulnerable. If the critics 
of payday lending are correct, we should see an increase (decrease) in 
signs of financial distress after the legalization (prohibition) of 
payday lending, and these changes should be more pronounced in 
areas with large military or minority populations. This Article uses 
county-level data to test this theory. The results, like those of the 
existing literature, are mixed. Bankruptcy filings do not increase 
after states legalize payday lending, and filings tend to fall in 
counties with large military communities. This result supports the 
beneficial view of payday lending, but it may be due to states’ 
incentives in enacting laws. This Article tests the effect of a change in 
federal law that should have had a disparate impact according to the 
prior choice of state law. This second test does not offer clear support 
for either the beneficial or detrimental view of payday lending. 
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I. Introduction 
In a typical payday loan, a consumer writes a $300 check that is 
payable in two weeks and receives $255 in cash.1 These terms 
translate into an annual percentage rate in excess of 450% and a 
compounded interest rate in excess of 6,800% per year.2 Despite 
these extremely high rates, the loans are popular; some estimate 
that payday lenders extend as much as $50 billion in loans each 
year.3  
Some scholars and consumer advocates call for strict usury 
limits or other laws designed to curtail or eliminate payday 
lending,4 and a growing number of state legislatures have heeded 
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Michael A. Stegman, Payday Lending, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 169, 
169 (2007) (“Thus, a typical example [of a payday loan] would be that in 
exchange for a $300 advance until the next payday, the borrower writes a 
postdated check for $300 and receives $255 in cash—the lender taking a $45 fee 
off the top.”). 
 2. See id. at 170 (“When the fee for a short-term payday loan is translated 
into an annual percentage rate (APR), the implied annual interest rate ranges 
between 400 and 1000 percent.”). 
 3. See id. (“Industry sources estimate more than a six-fold growth in 
payday loan volume in the last few years, from about $8 billion in 1999 to 
between $40 and $50 billion in 2004.”). 
 4. See Uriah King & Leslie Parrish, Springing the Debt Trap: Rate Caps 
Are Only Proven Payday Lending Reform, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 22 
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their call.5 We are also likely to see a substantial increase in federal 
regulation as the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act6 grants the new Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection authority over payday lenders.7 This Act prohibits the 
new bureau from setting an interest-rate cap.8 However, the new 
bureau might try to use its authority to regulate “unfair, deceptive, 
or abusive” acts to sharply curtail payday lending on the grounds 
that these loans cause “substantial injury to consumers” without 
offering sufficient countervailing benefits.9  
Some argue that payday loans only appear expensive if one 
assumes that the consumer has the same options available to the 
middle-class critic—many payday loan borrowers are severely credit 
constrained.10 A payday loan may be less expensive than bouncing a 
check, and payday loans may offer better credit terms than 
                                                                                                     
(Dec. 13, 2007), http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-
analysis/springing-the-debt-trap.pdf (encouraging states to pass a small loan 
cap at or around 36%). For a summary of this debate, see Ronald J. Mann & Jim 
Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855 (2007). 
 5. For example, in 2008, Ohio and New Hampshire set maximum annual 
interest rates below 50%. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Payday 
Lending 2008 Enacted Legislation (Jan. 2009), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
programs/banking/PaydayLend_2008.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (listing 
states that enacted payday lending legislation in 2008) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). For a list of other recent changes, see infra 
Table 1. 
 6. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (establishing financial regulatory 
reform in the United States after the financial crisis of the late 2000s). 
 7. See id. §§ 1001–1100H (establishing the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection and granting it the authority to regulate consumer financial products 
and services in compliance with federal law, including payday lenders). 
 8. See id. § 1027 (setting the limits on the authority of the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection). 
 9. See id. § 1031 (establishing that the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection can prevent, through regulation, a “service provider from committing 
or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act” in a financial product 
transaction that would “cause substantial injury to consumers”). For a recent 
article discussing the prospect for reform, see Jim Hawkins, The Federal 
Government in the Fringe Economy, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 23 (2011). 
 10. See, e.g., Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 885 (“It is easy for upper-
middle-class academics that study the topic to think that this lending is unduly 
risky and that those that engage in it would be better advised to tighten their 
belts and resist the temptation to borrow.”); see also Stegman, supra note 1, at 
173 (“Most payday loan customers are highly credit-constrained.”). 
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pawnshops and rent-to-own stores.11 More importantly, payday 
lending may be better than no credit at all. If a payday loan allows 
the consumer to repair her automobile, then it may save the 
consumer’s job and prevent further financial difficulties.12  Critics 
counter that payday loan borrowers do not repay their loans quickly 
and instead renew their loans repeatedly; consumers can become 
ensnared in a debt trap and incur hundreds of dollars in fees for 
each small loan and can lead to insolvency or bankruptcy.13 Critics 
further allege that payday lenders target military and minority 
populations,14 making these groups especially vulnerable. Some 
scholars take a more agnostic view of payday lending, arguing that 
this industry is unlikely to have a significant effect on the financial 
health of consumers because the dollar amounts involved are too 
small, and the number of available alternatives is too great,15 or 
because payday lenders and other fringe credit providers take steps 
                                                                                                     
 11. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 887–95 (explaining that payday 
lenders may provide better benefits and risks than competing products, such as 
subprime credit cards, pawnshops, rent-to-own transactions, and illegal 
sources); see also Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains, 102 J. FIN. 
ECON. 28, 30 (2011) (“[F]or the majority of people in my sample, no obvious 
alternative to a payday loan exists.”). 
 12. See Morse, supra note 11, at 28 (“Without access to credit, these small-
scale personal emergencies can lead to bounced checks, late fees, utility 
suspensions, repossessions, and, in some cases, foreclosures, evictions and 
bankruptcies.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Uriah King & Leslie Parrish, Phantom Demand: Short-Term 
Due Date Generates Need for Repeat Payday Loans, Accounting for 76% of Total 
Volume, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 19 (July 9, 2009), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/phantom-
demand-final.pdf (analyzing whether short-term due dates in payday lending 
can lead to a debt trap). Parrish and King specifically state: 
Being trapped in payday loan debt can have dire consequences for the 
financial health of families and their communities. Excess fees of $3.5 
billion per year are drained from trapped borrowers who vainly 
attempt to retire their payday loan debt. As a result, bank account 
closures, credit card delinquencies, delayed bill payment and medical 
care, and bankruptcies are more common among payday borrowers 
and in communities with access to payday lending and other high-
cost forms of credit.  
Id. 
 14. See infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (discussing whether 
payday lenders target military and minority populations). 
 15. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 885 (“[T]hese small loans 
probably do not contribute substantially to financial distress and insolvency.”). 
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that ensure that their customers repay.16 The existing empirical 
literature is inconclusive; some papers find results consistent with 
the debt–trap hypothesis while other papers find results consistent 
with the positive or agnostic views of payday lending.17  
This Article adds to the empirical literature on payday lending 
in three ways. First, this Article makes use of the claim that payday 
lenders target military and minority populations. If payday lending 
does affect financial distress, its effect should not be uniform 
throughout the state. We should see a more pronounced effect in 
areas where payday lenders actually locate. Measuring the 
correlation between the actual location of payday lenders and 
financial distress may yield biased results because the expected 
amount of financial distress may affect where payday lenders choose 
to open their stores. We can, however, mitigate this bias by using 
proxies for their choice of location. This Article uses minority, 
military, and moderate-income populations as proxies for the 
location of payday lenders. The use of these proxies also allows us to 
ask whether these groups are particularly vulnerable to payday 
lending. 
The second contribution is the measure of payday lending. Like 
prior articles, this Article makes use of changes in state laws 
regulating payday lending across time.18 However, a review of the 
annual reports of public corporations reveals that, until recently, 
                                                                                                     
 16. See Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link 
Between Fringe Banking and Financial Distress, 86 IND. L.J. 1361, 1362 (2011) 
(analyzing “policy implications of determining that fringe banking products do 
not cause distress”). Hawkins specifically states: 
I argue that the link between fringe banking and financial distress is 
dubious. Because fringe creditors cannot rely on borrowers’ credit 
scores to predict whether they will be repaid, creditors structure 
fringe credit products to virtually guarantee repayment. Because 
repayment is guaranteed by the structure of the transaction, it is 
nearly impossible for borrowers to take on unmanageable debt loads.  
Id. at 1361–62. 
 17. Compare supra note 13 and accompanying text (suggesting that there 
is evidence to support the debt–trap hypothesis in some communities with 
access to payday lending), with supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text 
(providing examples of papers that take a more agnostic view of payday 
lending). 
 18. See, e.g., infra note 58 and accompanying text (referring to an article 
that made use of changes in Georgia’s state laws regulating payday lending 
across time to test the debt–trap hypothesis). 
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payday lenders had stores in states where their loans were illegal 
under state law.19 Payday lenders were able to charge rates in 
excess of state usury limits by partnering with out-of-state banks,20 
but the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) effectively 
ended these partnerships in 2005.21 This paper makes use of this 
change in federal law as a natural experiment; the change in federal 
law should have had little effect in states where payday lending was 
legal under state law. 
This Article follows the literature in using the bankruptcy filing 
rate as a proxy for financial distress. However, just the attorneys’ 
fees for a bankruptcy filing can be more than a thousand dollars,22 
and many consumers may be too broke to file. This Article, 
therefore, supplements this measure with property crime rates and 
the rate at which landlords sue to evict their tenants.23 
                                                                                                     
 19. See, e.g., Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 879 (analyzing that 
recently many of the large national providers of payday loans had locations in 
Texas). While Texas law has unfavorable usury laws for payday lenders, these 
national providers were able to bypass Texas state law by partnering with out-
of-state banks. Id. In effect, when the national providers partnered with the out-
of-state banks, they were able to import the out-of-state banks’ rates. Id. 
 20. For example, the 2004 Annual Report for Advance America states: 
As of December 31, 2004, pursuant to our processing, marketing and 
servicing agreements with the lending banks, we are the processing, 
marketing and servicing agent for payday cash advances offered, 
made and funded by BankWest, Inc., a South Dakota bank . . . in 
Pennsylvania, First Fidelity Bank, a South Dakota bank, in 
Michigan, Republic Bank & Trust Company, a Kentucky bank . . . in 
North Carolina and Texas and Venture Bank, a Washington bank, in 
Arkansas.  
ADVANCE AM., INC., ANNUAL REPORT (Form 10-K) (Mar. 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1299704/000104746905008577/a215421
3z10-k.htm. 
 21. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 873 (“In July 2005, however, the 
FDIC issued its Guidelines on Payday Lending. . . . In practice, these new 
regulations have made it impractical for state-chartered banks to continue 
partnering with the major national providers.”); Stegman, supra note 1, at 179 
(“[I]n March 2005 the FDIC further tightened its guidance . . . render[ing] the 
rent-a-bank model obsolete.”). 
 22. See infra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing average attorneys’ 
fees in various bankruptcy filings). 
 23. Adair Morse also looks at property crime. See Morse, supra note 11, at 
29 (analyzing whether payday “loans mitigate or exacerbate the effect of 
financial distress on individuals’ welfare as measured by foreclosures and small 
property crimes”). Also, Brian Melzer uses various measures drawn from survey 
data. See Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the 
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This Article’s results match the conflict currently found in the 
literature. The regressions that utilize changes in state law are 
more consistent with the beneficial view of payday lending than the 
debt–trap hypothesis. When a state legalizes payday lending, 
bankruptcy filing rates tend to fall in counties with large military 
communities—one of the communities that payday lenders allegedly 
target. By contrast, the regressions that make use of the change in 
federal law do not produce robust results that support either the 
beneficial view of payday lending or the debt–trap hypothesis.  
Part II reviews the current payday-lending debate. Part III 
briefly describes the regulation of payday lending, and Part IV 
presents the results. Part V concludes. 
II. The Payday-Lending Debate 
The fact that consumers use payday loans suggests that they 
believe that these loans will, on average, improve their welfare. 
Consumers who suffer income or expense shocks (e.g., a medical bill, 
a car repair, etc.) may lack the savings necessary to pay in cash. A 
payday loan could be a cost-effective means of paying these bills; the 
extremely high annual interest rates may overstate the true cost of 
payday loans for consumers who repay quickly. Much of the roughly 
$50 charged for a $300 loan may be needed to cover inherent 
transaction costs, as other small-scale financial transactions require 
large fees. For example, Western Union charges $27 to send $300 
within the United States.24 The interest rate for a payday loan is 
dramatically higher than the rates charged by some other lenders, 
such as credit card issuers, but the consumer may have reached her 
credit limit and she may be unable to find a loan on more attractive 
terms.25 If the consumer is severely credit constrained, a payday 
                                                                                                     
Payday Lending Market, 126 Q.J. ECON. 517, 517 (2011) (using mainly data 
related to geographic differences in the availability of payday loans from survey 
data to assess “the real effects of credit access among low-income households”). 
 24. This is the price for the online service. It is slightly cheaper ($24) to 
send money from one of their locations. Compare and Price Western Union 
Services, WESTERN UNION, https://wumt.westernunion.com/WUCOMWEB/ 
shoppingAreaAction.do;jsessionid=dtee6Ms2Vg_nf8fQx0tCsfN?method=load&co
untryCode=US&languageCode=en&nextSecurePage=Y (last visited Apr. 10, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 25. See Morse, supra note 11, at 30 (“Research covering the last three 
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loan can help her withstand these shocks and improve her welfare. 
On the other hand, research suggests that at least some payday 
loan borrowers were not credit constrained and could have used 
credit cards or other sources to borrow more cheaply.26 Moreover, a 
number of scholars allege that consumers may be unable to control 
their impulses or suffer from cognitive failures that cause them to 
unduly prefer current over future consumption.27 For these debtors, 
a relaxation of their credit constraint may reduce their welfare.  
A number of prior studies have suggested that the legalization 
of payday lending can have substantial welfare effects and can even 
have measurable effects on proxies for financial distress, such as the 
number of bankruptcy filings,28 home foreclosures, and property 
crimes.29 Other scholars doubt these claims as a theoretical 
                                                                                                     
decades finds that up to 20% of U.S. residents are credit constrained . . . . When 
expense or income shocks arrive, banks and credit cards usually do not provide 
these constrained borrowers with distress loans.”). 
 26. See Sumit Agarwal, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday 
Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and Scoring Puzzles 7 (Working Paper, 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1327125 
(“Regarding liquidity, we find that most account holders with a major credit 
card issuer have substantial unused liquidity on their credit cards at the time 
they borrow on payday loans.”); Susan P. Carter, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy 
Tobacman, Pecuniary Mistakes?  Payday Borrowing by Credit Union Members 1 
(Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 2010-32, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1707657 (“We observe 
substantial payday loan use when cheaper sources of liquidity are 
available . . . .”). 
 27. See, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 
Q.J. ECON. 443, 443 (1997) (“Hyperbolic discount functions induce dynamically 
inconsistent preferences, implying a motive for consumers to constrain their 
own future choices.”). 
 28. See, e.g., Donald P. Morgan & Michael R. Strain, Payday Holiday: How 
Households Fare After Payday Credit Bans 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
Working Paper No. 309, 2007), available at http://www.newyorkfed. 
org/research/staff_reports/sr309.pdf (noting that after a particular credit ban, 
households in Georgia “were more likely to file for bankruptcy”); Paige Marta 
Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy? 1 (Vand. 
Univ. Law School Law & Econs., Working Paper No. 11-13, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1266215 (“We find evidence 
that access to payday loans does increase personal bankruptcy rates.”). But see 
Petru S. Stoianovici & Michael T. Maloney, Restrictions on Credit: A Public 
Policy Analysis of Payday Lending 1 (Working Paper, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1291278 (“Using state-level 
data between 1990 and 2006, we find no empirical evidence that payday lending 
leads to more bankruptcy filings . . . .”). 
 29. See Morse, supra note 11, at 29 (analyzing whether payday “loans 
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matter.30 In an earlier era, some economists argued that usury 
limits had no real effect on debt levels because they merely caused 
consumers to switch to other forms of credit, such as retail store 
credit, that were effectively unregulated.31 The same may be true of 
payday lending. In the absence of payday loans, consumers may 
have been able to use other substitutes to meet short-term cash 
needs or to overspend.32  
Some scholars suggest that the dollar amounts of payday loans 
are too small to have a material effect on financial hardship.33 Those 
who argue that payday lending can have measurable effects claim 
that a problem that is small, initially, can lead to a much larger 
problem. For example, Adair Morse argues that if a consumer lacks 
access to payday loans and other forms of credit, then even a small-
scale emergency can lead to substantial delinquency fees that can in 
turn lead to major problems, such as foreclosure, eviction, and/or 
bankruptcy.34 Industry critics argue that payday lending can 
ensnare consumers in a “debt trap.”35 Many debtors do not repay 
                                                                                                     
mitigate or exacerbate the effect of financial distress on individuals’ welfare as 
measured by foreclosures and small property crimes”). 
 30. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 885 (“[B]ecause the 
overwhelming majority of payday lending transactions do not result in default 
on the part of the borrower, there is some reason to think that many of the 
transactions benefit both the borrower and the lender.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Richard L. Peterson, Usury Laws and Consumer Credit: A 
Note, 38 J. FIN. 1299, 1299 (1983) (“Since funds are highly fungible, it is likely 
that consumers are able to substitute retail-originated credit for other sources of 
consumer credit at low cost.”). 
 32. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 886–95 (discussing that it would 
be near impossible to stop consumers from borrowing money if there is a great 
economic demand for consumer borrowing, even if that means consumers must 
turn to pawnshops, rent-to-own stores, or illegal sources). 
 33. See, e.g., id. at 885–86 (“[T]hese small loans probably do not contribute 
substantially to financial distress and insolvency.”). 
 34. See Morse, supra note 11, at 29 (explaining what may happen to a 
consumer lacking access to payday loans in a small-scale emergency). Adair 
Morse specifically states: 
Without access to credit, these small-scale personal emergencies can 
lead to bounced checks, late fees, utility suspensions, repossessions, 
and, in some cases, foreclosures, evictions and bankruptcies. The 
United States works very much on a fee-based system for 
delinquencies, such that once low-margin individuals get into 
distress, they often end up in a cycle of debt.  
Id. 
 35. See Stegman, supra note 1, at 176 (“The strongest critics say that 
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their loans quickly but instead roll over their debt by taking out a 
new loan to repay the first loan. The Center for Responsible Lending 
suggests that these repeat borrowers account for the vast majority 
(76%) of payday loans.36 In 2008, over 20% of Virginia’s payday loan 
borrowers had thirteen or more payday loans, and the average 
number of loans taken out by a borrower was 7.7.37 A recent study of 
Oklahoma borrowers suggests that in the first year after the 
average borrower takes out a payday loan, the borrower will be 
indebted for 212 days.38 Each time a consumer takes out a new loan, 
the consumer must pay a new set of fees. At roughly $15 to $30 per 
$100 for each two-week loan, the total fees can quickly exceed the 
amount originally borrowed. Brian Melzer estimates that about 40% 
of payday borrowers pay at least $500 in interest each year and that 
10% pay “upwards of $1000 in interest annually.”39 
In a recent article, Jim Hawkins argued that “the link between 
fringe banking and financial distress is dubious . . . [b]ecause 
repayment is guaranteed by the structure of the transaction, [and] it 
is nearly impossible for borrowers to take on unmanageable debt 
loads.”40 A relatively small percent of payday loans are charged off 
                                                                                                     
payday loans are the credit market’s equivalent of crack cocaine; a highly 
addictive source of easy money that hooks the unwary consumer into a 
perpetual cycle of debt . . . . Empirical evidence of the rollover phenomenon and 
serial borrowing through payday lending abounds.”). 
 36. See King & Parrish, supra note 13, at 3 (“Short-term due date 
generates need for repeat payday loans, accounting for 76% of total volume.”). 
 37. See BUREAU OF FIN. INSTS., STATE CORP. COMM’N, COMMONWEALTH OF 
VA., THE 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: 
PAYDAY LENDER LICENSEES, CHECK CASHERS, AND MOTOR VEHICLE TITLE LENDER 
LICENSEES 7 (2010), available at http://www.scc.virginia.gov/bfi/annual/ar04-
10.pdf (stating that 90,155 of 437,025 payday loan borrowers in 2008 took out 
more than thirteen loans, and the average number of loans taken out by a 
borrower was 7.7). Virginia enacted new legislation that took effect in January 
of 2009, and the number of repeat borrowers (and the volume of payday lending 
in Virginia) declined precipitously. The total volume of payday loans declined 
from $1,327,345,367 in 2008 to just $170,998,829 in 2010. Id. The number of 
individuals who received more than thirteen loans declined from 309,951 in 
2008 to just one in 2010. Id. 
 38. See Uriah King & Leslie Parrish, Payday Loans, Inc.: Short on Credit, 
Long on Debt, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 1 (Mar. 31, 2011), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/payday-loan-
inc.pdf (“[I]n their first year of payday loan use, borrowers are indebted an 
average of 212 days.”). 
 39. Melzer, supra note 23, at 549. 
 40. Hawkins, supra note 16, at 1361–62. 
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as uncollectible.41 For example, in 2008, Virginia payday lenders 
charged off just 3.2% of their loans as uncollectible,42 well below the 
average national credit card charge-off rate of 5.5% reported by 
banks in that year.43 To the extent that many payday loans are 
rolled over, the low charge-off rates are very misleading.44 Payday 
borrowers are not financially secure. Returning to the Virginia data 
again, payday lenders received approximately one bad check for 
every 2.5 individuals who took out a payday loan in 2008, and they 
charged off more than one bad check for every 4.2 individuals who 
took out a loan.45 Virginia took steps to limit the number of payday 
loans that an individual could take out in a single year,46 and the 
percentage of loans charged off as uncollectible rose substantially to 
                                                                                                     
 41. Some argue that the loss rate (bad loan losses divided by the total 
amount of loans made) for payday loans is so low that payday lenders need not 
worry about default and, therefore, the high interest rates are unjustified. See, 
e.g., Stegman, supra note 1, at 180 (“And the payday lender doesn’t have much 
to worry about, either. The ultimate default rate is 2% of gross loan 
receivables.”). 
 42. In 2008, Virginia’s payday lenders charged off $42,482,127 as 
uncollectible and extended $1,327,345,367 in payday loans. BUREAU OF FIN. 
INSTS., supra note 37, at 7.  
 43. Fed. Reserve Bd., Charge-Off and Delinquency Rates on Loans and 
Leases at Commercial Banks (Nov. 2011), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
releases/chargeoff/chgallsa.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 44. To get a sense of scale, assume that there is a 3% chance that a 
consumer will default on each loan and that the probability of default does not 
depend on the number of loans. A consumer who borrows thirteen payday loans 
in a year has about a 33% chance of defaulting on at least one payday loan (this 
is just one minus 0.97 raised to the power of thirteen). These assumptions are 
made for illustrative purposes; they are almost certainly incorrect. Consumers 
who take out more payday loans may be either more or less likely to default on a 
single loan than a consumer who just takes out one loan. In addition, the 
probability of default should be higher than the charge-off rate because the 
creditor may collect something after default. In fact, Virginia creditors are able 
to collect in full on more than half of the checks that initially return unpaid. See 
BUREAU OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 37, at 7 (stating that in Virginia, in 2010, a 
total of 50,455 borrower checks were returned unpaid, but of these returned 
checks, 29,981 were ultimately paid). 
 45. See id. (stating that in 2008, 437,025 individuals in Virginia took out a 
payday loan, 176,632 checks were returned as unpaid, the payday lenders 
received payments on 76,724 of these checks, and they charged off 104,832 
checks as uncollectible). 
 46. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 5 (listing states, 
including Virginia, that enacted payday lending legislation in 2008). 
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9.6% in 2010,47 slightly higher than the average credit card charge-
off rate that year of 9.4%.48 The rate at which lenders received bad 
checks fell slightly (one bad check for every 4.3 borrowers in 2010).49  
Payday lending did not cause the insolvency of all of these 
consumers. Many consumers use these loans for necessities and 
financial emergencies; these consumers were in financial trouble 
before they found their way to the payday lender. Those who defend 
high-interest loans use this fact to argue that payday loans may 
even reduce financial distress by allowing the consumer to take care 
of immediate problems (such as overdue rent) before they can 
become much worse problems (such as eviction).50 
Whether payday lending causes or deepens financial distress or 
insolvency is a question that should play an important role in the 
policy debate. If no link is shown, critics of the industry could still 
argue that the tests or proxies are not sufficiently sensitive to find 
any effect. However, the absence of a measured effect makes it less 
likely that any effect is economically significant. Critics may also 
argue in favor of the elimination of these loans, even in the absence 
of a rise in signs of financial distress, by arguing that they are a 
horrible deal for consumers. However, there are a number of other 
goods and services that would appear to be a horrible deal for 
consumers in general, the poor in particular, and these products do 
not evoke the same level of passion as high-interest loans. 
A finding that payday loans increase financial distress or 
insolvency is also insufficient to show that these loans should be 
banned. We could probably reduce insolvency by banning consumer 
credit,51 but this would almost certainly reduce welfare. If 
                                                                                                     
 47. See id. (showing that Virginia payday lenders extended $170,988,829 in 
payday loans and charged-off $16,406,588 as uncollectible). 
 48. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 43. 
 49. See BUREAU OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 37, at 7 (showing that 146,319 
individuals took out a payday loan, that 50,455 borrower checks were returned 
unpaid, and that 33,723 checks were ultimately returned as uncollectible). 
 50. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 11, at 29 (“Without access to credit, these 
small-scale personal emergencies can lead to bounced checks . . . repossessions, 
and, in some cases, foreclosures, evictions and bankruptcies.”). 
 51. I say “probably” because consumers may be rendered insolvent (at least 
on a cash flow basis) by involuntary claims such as tort judgments or quasi-
voluntary claims such as medical bills. Consumer credit may reduce these forms 
of insolvency by allowing the consumer to use future earnings to pay current 
expenses. 
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consumers consider the risk of insolvency when borrowing, then no 
regulation is necessary. Policymakers may, however, believe that 
consumers suffer from cognitive failure52 or fail to consider the effect 
of their insolvency on third parties.53 Policymakers may, therefore, 
wish to have some idea of the magnitude of the effect that payday 
lending has on insolvency. Unfortunately, the results of the 
literature are inconclusive.54 
Some prior empirical studies support the debt–trap hypothesis. 
Brian Melzer uses a survey in which households report when they 
have difficulty paying their mortgage, rent, or utility bill, or when 
they move out of their home due to financial difficulties, or when 
they delay medical or dental care due to financial circumstances.55 
He focuses on the response of households in three states that 
prohibit payday lending (Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New 
York) and reports that households in counties that border states 
that allow payday lending are more likely to report financial trouble 
than households in other parts of the state.56 He further tests 
                                                                                                     
 52. This argument is sometimes phrased in vague terms of “overoptimism.” 
However, overoptimism can lead consumers to borrow either too little or too 
much. See Richard M. Hynes, Overoptimism and Overborrowing, 2004 BYU L. 
REV. 127, 127 (2004) (stating that while scholars have “long argued that 
overoptimism causes consumers to overborrow,” some forms of overoptimism 
“may actually cause consumers to borrow less than they would if they accurately 
perceived the risks they face”). 
 53. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 884 (“Specifically, there is good 
reason to think that financial distress generates costs for society as a whole that 
are not borne by the parties to the transaction.”). The effect of the externality of 
debt is theoretically ambiguous. Consumers may borrow too much because they 
fail to consider the effect of their insolvency on their friends, family, or social 
safety net. They may also borrow too little because they fail to consider the 
benefits that their friends and family derive from the additional consumption 
possible due to the borrowing. They may also fail to consider the benefits to the 
social safety net if their borrowing allows them to recover from a financial shock 
more quickly and therefore not need as much social assistance. 
 54. For a recent review of the literature, see John P. Caskey, Payday 
Lending: New Research and the Big Question (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. 
Working Papers Research Dep’t, Paper No. 10-32, 2010), available at 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/ 
2010/wp10-32.pdf. 
 55. See Melzer, supra note 23, at 517 (describing the survey factors used in 
Melzer’s study on the effects of credit access among low-income households). 
 56. See id. at 533 (“The estimated coefficient on PaydayAccess is positive in 
each family hardship regression, which means that families in payday access 
areas report more financial problems.”). 
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whether households experience an unusual increase in financial 
trouble if they border a state that has recently legalized payday 
lending, and two of his nine measures of hardship show results that 
are statistically significant at the 10% level.57 Dennis Campbell, F. 
Asis Jerez, and Peter Tafano examine the rate at which banks close 
accounts without the consent of the account holder, and they find 
that after Georgia banned payday lending this rate was lower in 
Georgia’s counties than in the counties of the neighboring states.58 
Their results are consistent with the debt–trap hypothesis, but they 
are also consistent with banks closing troubled accounts that are 
less profitable due to the loss of overdraft fees as consumers use a 
cheaper alternative—payday loans.59  
Paige Skiba and Jeremy Tobacman used individual-level data 
from a payday lender in Texas and found that applicants who were 
given a payday loan were more likely to file for Chapter 13 
bankruptcy within one or two years than those who were denied the 
loan.60 None of their specifications found a statistically significant 
effect on the rate at which consumers chose the more common form 
of bankruptcy, Chapter 7.61 North Carolina banned payday lending 
                                                                                                     
 57. Id. at 539–40, tbl. V.  “Moved Out” (defined as moving out of one’s home 
or apartments) and “Any Care Postponed” (defined as the postponement or 
delay of any type of health care) are statistically significant at the 10% level, 
and “Any Family Hardship” (defined as when a family experiences hardships, 
such as reducing meals because of lack of money) and “Drug Purchase 
Postponed” (defined as an indicator for whether an individual has forgone or 
postponed needed care because of a lack of money or insurance) are close. See id. 
at 526–47 (defining the measures used for the study and testing how access to 
payday loans affect economic hardship). 
 58.  See Dennis Campbell, F. Asis Martinez-Jerez & Peter Tufano, 
Bouncing Out of the Banking System: An Empirical Analysis of Involuntary 
Account Closures 26–30 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1335873 (exploring the link 
between access to payday lending and involuntary closure activity after the 
state of Georgia banned payday lending in 2004). 
 59. See Brian Melzer & Donald P. Morgan, Competition and Adverse 
Selection in a Consumer Loan Market: The Curious Case of Overdraft vs. Payday 
Credit 1 (Working Paper, 2008), available at http://www.kellogg.north 
western.edu/faculty/melzer/ (suggesting that the presence of payday loans may 
make deposit accounts riskier and less profitable). 
 60. See Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 28, at 1 (finding evidence that 
“access to payday loans does increase personal bankruptcy rates”). 
 61. See id. at 2 (“We find no significant effects on chapter 7 bankruptcies.”). 
Paige Skiba and Jeremy Tobacman suggest that because payday borrowers have 
income, they may be encouraged to file under Chapter 13 by either their lawyers 
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in 2005, and a survey of low- and middle-income North Carolinians 
and former payday borrowers suggests that these groups 
overwhelmingly view the absence of payday lending as beneficial 
rather than harmful.62 However, less than 8% of those contacted 
completed the survey, and there is a very large risk that those who 
bothered to respond are not representative of the entire sample.63  
A few studies focus on the impact that payday lending has on 
military or minority populations. Steven Graves and Christopher 
Peterson find that payday lenders tend to open stores in areas with 
large military populations.64 Similarly, Micahel Stegman and 
Robert Faris and the Center for Responsible Lending find that 
payday lenders are more likely to concentrate in areas with large 
minority populations.65 My own empirical methodology relies on the 
accuracy of these results, but the results themselves are 
normatively ambiguous. It is possible that these are simply groups 
who have a greater need for short-term credit. Scott Carrell and 
Jonathon Zinman provide more direct evidence of a harmful effect; 
                                                                                                     
or the bankruptcy judges. Id. An alternative explanation is that these debtors 
may lack the cash necessary to pay the fees necessary to file under Chapter 7. 
By filing under Chapter 13, they can pay their attorneys over time. 
 62. See Univ. of N.C. Ctr. for Cmty. Capital, North Carolina Consumers 
After Payday Lending: Attitudes and Experiences with Credit Options, CTR. FOR 
CMTY. CAPITAL, 1 (Nov. 2007), http://ccc.unc.edu/documents/NC_After_ 
Payday.pdf (“More than twice as many former payday borrowers reported that 
the absence of payday lending has had a positive rather than a negative effect 
on their household.”). 
 63. See id. at 2 (“The cooperation rate was a low 7.79%, primarily because 
we were unable to contact anyone at many of the numbers called.”). 
 64. See Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending 
and the Military: The Law and Geography of “Payday” Loans in Military Towns, 
66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 654 (2005) (stating that the article “provides geographic 
evidence that payday lenders do aggressively target American military 
personnel, irrespective of most forms of legal regulation”). 
 65. See Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business 
Model that Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 13 (2003) 
(noting that one study, for example, showed that Charlotte, NC fringe banks 
“disproportionately favored high-minority neighborhoods”); see also Wei Li et al., 
Predatory Profiling: The Role of Race and Ethnicity in the Location of Payday 
Lenders in California, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 25 (Mar. 26, 2009),  
http://www.responsiblelending.org/california/ca-payday/research-analysis/ 
predatory-profiling.pdf (“We find that payday lenders tend to locate closer to 
and cluster in African American and Latino communities.”). 
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they find that payday lending reduces the performance and 
retention of Air Force personnel.66 
The evidence in favor of the debt–trap hypothesis must be 
balanced against a number of studies that are clearly inconsistent 
with the theory. Jonathon Zinman measures changes in 
employment and subjective descriptions of well-being in Oregon and 
Washington surrounding the imposition of a binding rate cap in 
Oregon in 2007.67 His results suggest that Oregon’s prohibition of 
payday lending caused: (i) consumers to shift to more expensive 
sources of credit such as bank overdraft protection, (ii) a fall in 
employment, (iii) a fall in subjective measures of financial well-
being, and (iv) an increase in the rate at which telephones are 
disconnected.68 However, Zinman’s data are taken from the first five 
months after the imposition of the rate cap, and he acknowledges 
that these short-run effects may differ from the long-term effects.69 
Adair Morse focuses on the ability of consumers to use payday 
lending to smooth income after a financial shock.70 Specifically, she 
measures the resiliency of communities after natural disasters and 
finds that communities with greater concentrations of payday 
lenders see a smaller increase in the rate of foreclosure and a 
smaller increase in the crime rate.71 Morse acknowledges that her 
                                                                                                     
 66. See Scott E. Carrell & Jonathan Zinman, In Harm’s Way? Payday Loan 
Access and Military Personnel Performance 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. 
Working Papers Research Dep’t, Paper No. 08-18, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1269414 (finding that 
payday lending has produced “significant average declines in overall job 
performance and retention” in Air Force personnel). 
 67. See Jonathan Zinman, Restricting Consumer Credit Access: Household 
Survey Evidence on Effects Around the Oregon Rate Cap, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 
546, 546 (2009) (“I examine some short-run effects of restricting access, using 
household panel survey data on payday loan users collected around the 
imposition of binding restrictions on payday loan terms in Oregon.”).  
 68. See id. at 554 (discussing the results of Zinman’s study using household 
survey data on the effects of restricting access to expensive consumer credit on 
payday loan users). 
 69. See id. at 553 (acknowledging that “short-run measures may capture 
transitional rather than equilibrium outcomes,” and that “[b]orrowers may need 
time to adjust to the new regime”). 
 70. See Morse, supra note 11, at 38–43 (studying the welfare effects of 
access to payday loans for credit-constrained individuals due to financial shock). 
 71. See id. at 29 (explaining that payday lenders can mitigate the number 
of foreclosures in a given area in the year following a natural disaster, and the 
“results indicate that payday lenders alleviate individuals’ need to resort to 
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test focuses on the possibly beneficial effect of payday lending 
(helping the consumer withstand an income or expense shock), and 
that payday lending could also increase financial distress among 
consumers who suffer from cognitive failures.72 
Donald  Morgan and Michael Strain use the Survey of 
Consumer Finance and find that consumers who are deemed to be 
more vulnerable to predatory lending are less likely to report 
missing a debt payment if they live in a state that allows payday 
lending.73 Critics of payday lending may argue, however, that a 
single missed debt payment does not adequately capture the concept 
of a debt trap. Payday lending may indeed help the consumer 
mitigate a temporary setback by allowing her to borrow more to pay 
old debts. However, an increased debt burden may increase the 
chance that the consumer experiences more serious credit problems. 
Donald Morgan and Michael Strain find that states that legalize 
payday lending tend to experience a decline in variables capturing 
household credit problems relative to other states, and that states 
that abolish payday lending experience an increase in these 
variables.74 Specifically, they find that complaints against debt 
collectors, automobile and mobile home repossession rates, and 
bankruptcy filings all increase in states that ban payday lending 
and decrease in states that liberalize restrictions on payday 
lending.75 Their results rest on the effects of legal changes in just 
four states, but Petru Stoinanovici and Michael Maloney also use 
                                                                                                     
small property crimes in times of financial distress”). 
 72. See id. (“Because I do not identify the net benefit of payday lending 
across the distribution of borrowers, my results . . . do not speak to the effect on 
those habitually falling to temptation. In this sense, payday lenders can be both 
heroes and villains.”). 
 73. Donald P. Morgan & Michael R. Strain, Defining and Detecting 
Predatory Lending 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Working Paper No. 273, 2007), 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr273.pdf (noting 
that consumers that are more vulnerable to predatory lending and “happen to 
live in states that allow unlimited payday loans” are actually “less likely to have 
missed a debt payment over the previous year”). 
 74. See Morgan & Strain, supra note 28, at 24 (explaining the results of the 
study suggest household credit “problems appear less persistent when larger 
payday loans are available”). 
 75. See id. at 26 (suggesting states that ban payday lending do not seem 
better off because “they have bounced more checks, complained more about 
lenders and debt collectors, and have filed for Chapter 7 (‘no asset’) bankruptcy 
at a higher rate”). 
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state-level bankruptcy data and changes in the regulation of 
bankruptcy filing, and they too find no evidence that payday lending 
increases bankruptcy filings.76 However, the use of state-level data 
may mask any adverse effects on the groups that are allegedly the 
targets of payday lenders: minorities and the military. Lars Lefgren 
and Frank McIntyre use zip-code-level data and find no evidence in 
their cross-sectional regressions that payday lending impacts the 
bankruptcy filing rate.77 However, they do not test for a possible 
interaction between payday lending and military and minority 
communities, and the use of a single time period makes it much 
more difficult to control for the effect of omitted variables. 
III. The Regulation of Payday Lending 
Consumer advocacy groups provide thorough summaries of the 
laws regulating payday lending,78 and so this Part will only outline 
some basic elements of the law to motivate the tests presented 
below. Subpart A describes the state laws regulating payday 
lending, and subpart B describes the federal law. 
A. State Regulation 
Most states have usury laws that prohibit loans with very high 
interest rates. Early payday lenders argued that these laws did not 
apply because they were not making loans and that they were 
                                                                                                     
 76. See Stoianovici & Maloney, supra note 28, at 1 (“Using state-level data 
between 1990 and 2006, we find no empirical evidence that payday lending 
leads to more bankruptcy filings . . . .”). 
 77. See Lars Lefgren & Frank McIntyre, Explaining the Puzzle of Cross-
State Differences in Bankruptcy Rates, 52 J.L. & ECON. 367, 367 (2009) 
(revealing, using zip-code-level data, that “payday loan regulations contribute 
virtually nothing to the cross-state variance in filing rates”). 
 78. See, e.g., Leah A. Plunkett, Emily Caplan & Nathanael Player, Small 
Dollar Loan Products Score Card–Updated, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. 2–4 
(May 7, 2010), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/payday_ 
loans/cu-small-dollar-scorecard-2010.pdf (providing a summary of how states 
are exercising their authority under state laws involving payday loans, auto-
title loans, and other various short-term loans); see also Mann & Hawkins, 
supra note 4, at 871–80 (providing an overview of laws regulating payday 
lending). 
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charging fees instead of interest.79 Lenders have also sought to 
evade usury limits by disguising their loans. For example, the 
Consumers Federation of America claims that a growing number of 
lenders recharacterize payday loans as short-term Internet access 
contracts with up-front cash rebates.80 
More recently, payday lenders have succeeded in lobbying for 
explicit regulations that exempt them from standard usury laws.81 
These laws vary along several dimensions, including the 
requirements to obtain a license, the disclosures that a lender must 
provide to a consumer, the number of times that a lender can “roll 
over” a loan, and the number of loans that a consumer can have at 
any one time. Some of these differences could have real effects on 
consumers, especially in states that have databases that allow the 
regulator to gather real-time data from all payday lenders. 
However, this Article will focus solely on whether payday lending is 
prohibited in a state. 
This Article makes use of the time series variation in payday 
lending. Payday lending has always been illegal in some states and 
always legal in others due to a lack of usury restrictions. However, 
the wave of legislation exempting payday lenders from usury laws 
occurred in the late 1990s and early years of this century, and some 
states have recently banned payday lending by, for example, 
capping interest rates at a level at which a lender cannot profitably 
extend very short-term loans.82 This Article matches these changes 
to measures of financial distress. 
                                                                                                     
 79. See Jean Ann Fox, Unsafe and Unsound: Payday Lenders Hide Behind 
FDIC Bank Charters to Peddle Usury, CONSUMERS FED’N OF AM. 7 (Mar. 30, 
2004, www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/pdlrentabankreport.pdf (“Early payday 
lenders used inventive schemes to hide the true nature of their loans.”). 
 80. See id. at 8 (noting that lenders in a growing number of states, such as 
North Carolina and Indiana, are using the sale of Internet access contracts to 
disguise their payday lending operations). 
 81. See id. at 6 (“Payday loan laws enacted in states that also have small 
loan rate caps and/or usury laws exempt payday loans from application of those 
laws, granting lenders safe harbor from usury.”). 
 82. See infra Appendix (providing state laws on payday lending for all fifty 
states). 
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B. Federal Regulation 
Many generally applicable consumer lending laws (such as the 
Truth in Lending Act83) apply to payday loans, and in 2007, 
Congress prohibited lenders from charging more than 36% interest 
on loans to military personnel and their dependents.84 However, the 
most significant federal legislation for the purposes of this Article’s 
analysis is the ability that federal law grants to federal and state 
banks to charge interest in excess of the usury limits imposed by the 
state where the borrower resides. According to the National Bank 
Act,85 a nationally chartered bank can charge any rate permitted by 
the state where it is located,86 and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act87 gives state-chartered banks the same right.88 Some lenders 
partnered with out-of-state banks so that they could lend in states 
with strict usury limits.89 In 2000 and 2001, the Comptroller of the 
Currency took steps to prevent nationally chartered banks from 
forming partnerships with payday lenders, and in 2005, the FDIC 
adopted regulations designed to discourage state chartered banks 
from forming these partnerships.90 According to Ronald Mann and 
                                                                                                     
 83. See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2006) (establishing 
generally applicable consumer lending laws designed to promote the informed 
use of consumer credit). 
 84. See 10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (2006) (stating a creditor “may not impose an 
annual percentage rate of interest greater than 36 percent with respect to the 
consumer credit extended to a covered member” of the armed forces or their 
dependents). 
 85. See National Bank Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21–216d (2006) (creating a 
federal–state dual structure banking system in the United States by 
establishing a system of national charters for banks). 
 86. See id. § 85 (“Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on 
any loan or discount made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other 
evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State . . . where 
the bank is located.”); see also Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 
439 U.S. 299, 308 (1978) (noting a designated national bank may charge interest 
rates governed by federal law). 
 87. See Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811–1831aa (2006) 
(establishing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to insure the deposits 
of specified banks and savings associations). 
 88. See id. § 1831d(a) (stating that “to prevent discrimination against 
State-chartered insured depository institutions,” state-chartered banks may 
charge any rate permitted by the state where it is located). 
 89. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (providing Advance America 
as an example of a payday lender that is partnering with out-of-state banks). 
 90. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 873 (explaining that the FDIC’s 
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Jim Hawkins, “[B]y early 2006, the rent-a-charter era had come to 
an end.”91 
One could argue that payday lending was legal in every state 
until the FDIC eliminated the partnerships between payday lenders 
and out-of-state banks. However, this argument almost surely 
overstates the importance of these partnerships. First, the prior 
literature suggests that some states, such as New York, were able to 
effectively prohibit payday lending even before the FDIC reforms by 
challenging the claim that the out-of-state bank made the payday 
loan.92 Second, very small firms dominated the payday lending 
market during the period studied by this Article,93 and these firms 
may have found it too costly to partner with an out-of-state bank. I 
therefore conduct two tests. The first uses a measure (Payday) that 
asks simply whether payday lending was legal under state law in 
the prior year. The second uses a measure (FDIC) that focuses solely 
on the change in federal law; this change should have had a much 
greater impact on counties in states that had laws prohibiting 
payday lending but were unable to enforce these laws. 
IV. Measuring the Effect of Payday Lending 
This Article searches for a correlation between the legalization 
of payday lending and various measures of financial hardship. I use 
three basic measures: bankruptcy, property crime rates, and 
landlord–tenant disputes. I focus most heavily on bankruptcy 
                                                                                                     
2005 regulations “do not directly prohibit partnering with third-party payday 
lenders, [but] they do impose onerous capital requirements” and limit the 
extensions, deferrals, and renewals for payday loans); Stegman, supra note 1, at 
178–79 (discussing the Comptroller of the Currency’s advisories “that promised 
closer scrutiny and additional examinations of banks and thrifts that were 
partnering with payday loan companies”). Also, “[i]n July 2003, the FDIC issued 
its own guidelines for state-chartered banks engaged with payday lenders.” Id. 
at 179. 
 91. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 877. 
 92. See id. at 879–80 (“What raises our interest, however, is the utter 
absence of New York locations from the annual reports of the large national 
providers.”). 
 93. See id. at 866 (“On the other hand, the majority of stores in the 
industry are still small shops as large national providers have less than 5000 
locations, far less than a quarter of the total stores. The mom-and-pop providers 
still dominate the market.”). 
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because it is the more common measure of financial distress and, as 
a federal law, has a common meaning across states. Bankrupt 
consumers can choose to file under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.94 
Chapter 7 offers the consumer a quick discharge of her unsecured 
debts, but the consumer can only keep assets used as collateral (the 
car, the home) if her secured creditor consents; Chapter 13 offers the 
consumer more protection against these secured creditors, but if she 
is to receive a discharge the consumer must remain in bankruptcy 
and make payments for three to five years.95 I do not have a strong 
theory predicting that payday lending should have a different 
impact depending on the type of bankruptcy, and so I test for the 
effect on total nonbusiness bankruptcies, nonbusiness Chapter 7 
bankruptcies, and Chapter 13 bankruptcies. All measures are 
expressed per 100,000 individuals.96 I use county-level data from 
1998 through 2009 provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts.97 Bankruptcy is, however, an imperfect measure of financial 
                                                                                                     
 94. Consumers can also file under Chapter 11, but very few do. Of the 
1,536,799 nonbusiness bankruptcies filed in 2010, just 1,939 (.01%) were filed 
under Chapter 11. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Cts., Bankruptcy Statistics, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx (last visited Apr. 
10, 2012) (providing statistics and tables on United States bankruptcy filings 
dating back as far as the 1990s) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 95. For a description of these options, see BARRY E. ADLER, DOUGLAS G. 
BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 2007). 
 96. I used county population estimates from the Bureau of the Census. 
Bureau of the Census, Population and Housing Unit Estimates (Jan. 5, 2012), 
http://www.census.gov/popest/estimates.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Although I have bankruptcy data 
for 2010, county population estimates for 2010 were incomplete. I tested both 
the filing rate and the log of the filing rate, though I do not have a strong 
theoretical reason to choose one over the other, and the residuals of each type of 
regression approximate a normal distribution due to the inclusion of both fixed-
county and fixed-year effects. The results of the log regressions are similar to 
those of the untransformed variables and are available upon request.  
 97. 2010 data is available as well, but I do not have population data for all 
counties in 2010. Specifically, I use bankruptcies listed in Report F5-A 
downloaded from PACER. The Administrative Office data lists a small number 
of filings in the “wrong” jurisdiction. For example, filings for Los Angeles County 
appear in multiple districts within California. I tried two approaches. First, I 
simply summed the number of bankruptcies for a given county regardless of 
where the petition was filed. Second, I used only the highest number of 
bankruptcies filed in a single district for that county. There is no real difference 
in the two approaches. Even after converting the data into filing rates (dividing 
by population), the correlation between the two measures is approximately 
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distress. The available evidence suggests that the vast majority of 
consumers who cannot or will not repay their debts do not file for 
bankruptcy.98 Many debtors are simply too broke to file; attorneys’ 
fees average more than $1,000 in Chapter 7, and in some 
jurisdictions, Chapter 13 attorneys’ fees average $4,000.99 
Consumers who take out payday loans may be especially unlikely to 
file. In 2008, Virginia’s payday lenders charged off 104,832 checks 
as uncollectible.100 By contrast, Virginians filed 27,580 nonbusiness 
bankruptcy petitions in 2008,101 and it is likely that many bankrupt 
debtors never visited a payday lender.  
Adair Morse suggests that the presence of payday lending can 
have a measurable effect on the crime rate.102 I test this by 
examining the change in the number of burglaries, larcenies, motor 
vehicle thefts, and all property crimes after the legalization of 
payday lending.103 All crime rates are expressed per 100,000 
residents. Insolvent consumers may have difficulty paying their 
rent, and I test whether there is a change in the rate of eviction 
after the legalization of payday lending. Specifically, I look at the 
                                                                                                     
0.995. I therefore present the results for the measure that sums bankruptcies 
for each county across all districts. 
 98. See Amanda Dawsey, Richard M. Hynes & Lawrence Ausubel, The 
Regulation of Non-Judicial Debt Collection and the Consumer’s Choice Among 
Repayment, Bankruptcy and Informal Bankruptcy 1 (Univ. of Va. Law Sch. Law 
& Econs. Research Paper Series,Working Paper No. 2009-13, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1487649 (noting that the 
“majority of defaulting consumers do not file for bankruptcy”). 
 99. See U.S. GOV’T  ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: DOLLAR 
COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT OF 2005 8 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d08697.pdf (estimating the average attorneys’ fees for a Chapter 7 
and Chapter 13 bankruptcy). 
 100. BUREAU OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 37, at 7. 
 101. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. CTS., TABLE F-2: U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS–
BUSINESS AND NON-BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY CASES COMMENCED BY CHAPTER OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2008 
(2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/Statistical 
TablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2008/dec08/F02Dec08.pdf. 
 102. See Morse, supra note 11, at 29 (analyzing whether payday “loans 
mitigate or exacerbate the effect of financial distress on individuals’ welfare as 
measured by foreclosures and small property crimes”). 
 103. The number of these arrests is taken from the Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program Data, and I use data from 1996–2008. I test total property 
crimes, larceny, burglary, and motor vehicle thefts. 
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number of landlord–tenant disputes in Florida,104 Maryland,105 and 
North Carolina.106 Litigation rates vary dramatically from state to 
state due to differences in landlord–tenant and civil procedure 
rules,107 and the model relies on fixed-county effects to account for 
many of these differences. North Carolina prohibited payday 
lending in December of 2005, providing the basis of this test.108 I am 
also able to make use of the change in FDIC rules, as this change 
and an increase in penalties for violating usury laws caused some 
national lenders to withdraw from the North Carolina market.  
A. The Effect of Changes in State Laws Regulating Payday Lending 
Equation 1: yit=α + β1*Paydayi,t-1 + β2*Unempi,t-1 + β3*(Unempi,t-1)2 + 
β4*Exempi,t + β5*(Exempi,t)2+ β6*Paydayi,t-1 *Militaryi + β7*Paydayi,t-1 
*(Militaryi)2 + β8*Paydayi,t-1 *Minorityi + β9*Paydayi,t-1 *(Minorityi)2 + 
β10*Paydayi,t-1 *Incl15i+ β11*Paydayi,t-1 *Inc1550 i + β12*BAPCPAi,t 
*Militaryi + β13* BAPCPAi,t *(Militaryi)2 + β14* BAPCPAi,t *Minorityi 
+ β15* BAPCPAi,t *(Minorityi)2 + β16* BAPCPAi,t *Incl15i + β16* 
BAPCPAi,t *Inc1550 i + ui+vt + eit 
I begin first with regressions that focus solely on state laws. 
Equation 1 presents the full specification. All regressions include 
fixed-county and fixed-year effects; the fixed-county effects will 
account for any differences between counties that do not change 
over time, and the fixed-year effects will account for any 
macroeconomic shocks or legal changes that affected all counties 
                                                                                                     
 104. Statistics for evictions in County Civil Courts in Florida are available 
at http://trialstats.flcourts.org/. 
 105. Statistics for District Court landlord–tenant filings in Maryland are 
available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/publications.html. 
 106. The North Carolina Courts sent statistics on Summary Ejectment by 
County by email. Georgia also makes county-level eviction data available, but I 
do not use it in the presented regressions for reasons described below. 
 107. For a discussion of these differences, see Richard M. Hynes, Broke But 
Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State Court, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1 
(2008). 
 108. See Scott A. Hefner, Payday Lending in North Carolina: Now You See 
It, Now You Don’t, 11 N.C. BANKING INST. 263, 264 (2007) (“On December 22, 
2005, Commissioner of Banks, Joseph A. Smith, Jr., put an end to ‘rent-a-
charter’ payday lending in North Carolina by holding that the practice violated 
the North Carolina Consumer Finance Act.”). 
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equally. All regressions also include the unemployment rate in the 
county from the prior year (Unempi,t-1), and regressions that use the 
bankruptcy filing rate as the dependent variable include the real 
value (adjusted for inflation) of property exemptions available in the 
state, which is measured by the exemptions available to married 
homeowners with two children (Exempi,t).109 To account for any 
nonlinear effects (e.g., the effect of a ten thousand dollar increase in 
exemptions may not be equal to ten times the effect of a one 
thousand dollar increase in exemptions), I include the squared value 
of these terms. I use the county as the unit of observation, and 
county population varies tremendously. My regressions are 
weighted by the county’s population in 2000. All standard errors 
allow for clustering at the state level.  
The regressions include a dummy variable equal to one if 
payday lending was legal in that state in the prior year 
(Paydayi,t-1);110 I lag this variable as there is usually some delay 
between the time of the onset of financial distress and the filing 
of a bankruptcy petition.111 The coefficient on this dummy 
variable estimates the change in the measure of financial 
distress (bankruptcy, crime, or landlord–tenant litigation) after 
a state legalizes payday lending.  
Prior research suggests that payday lenders locate in areas 
with large military or minority populations.112 If this is correct, we 
should expect the legalization or prohibition of payday lending to 
have a disproportionate effect in these areas. I therefore include the 
interaction between the dummy for payday lending and the percent 
                                                                                                     
 109. Many states have exemptions that are limited by type rather than 
dollar amount. To minimize this problem, I consider only homestead 
exemptions, automobile exemptions, and exemptions that can be used to exempt 
cash (“wildcard” exemptions). Unfortunately, a few states have “unlimited” 
homestead or motor-vehicle exemptions. To address this, I cap the value of a 
homestead exemption at $500,000 in 2005 and the motor-vehicle exemption at 
$30,000. For other years, I adjust the caps for inflation. 
 110. If payday lending were legal in only part of that year, I set the dummy 
variable equal to that fraction of the year in which payday lending was legal. 
 111. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann & Katherine M. Porter, Saving Up for 
Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289, 292 (2010) (examining “why people file 
[bankruptcy] when they do and what distinguishes those who choose to file from 
those who delay or avoid filing”). 
 112. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (providing research that 
suggests payday lenders target geographic locations with large military and 
minority populations). 
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of the population in 2000 that was nonwhite (Paydayi,t-1*minorityi) 
and the percent of the workforce that was in the military (Paydayi,t-
1*militaryi).113 I include the square of each of these values to account 
for nonlinear effects. 
Prior research also suggests that the importance of payday 
lending should vary by income. Very low-income households are 
unlikely to use payday loans because they may not have 
employment and a bank account; most payday-loan borrowers have 
incomes between $15,000 and $50,000.114 I therefore interact the 
payday-lending variable with the percentage of county households 
that fell into various income categories (less than $15,000, $15,000–
$50,000, and more than $50,000) in 1999. 
The 2005 bankruptcy reforms took effect in October of that 
year, and the number of bankruptcies filed dropped by about 70% 
between 2005 and 2006.115 Fixed-year effects will account for any 
effects of this law that were uniform across the country. However, 
the reforms may have had a disproportionate effect on the same 
groups that we are using to test the impact of payday lending. For 
example, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates 
                                                                                                     
 113. Because these measures do not change over time, there is no need to 
include the military and minority populations in a regression with fixed-county 
effects. 
 114. See Melzer, supra note 23, at 523 (discussing individuals who generally 
use payday loans). Specifically, Brian Melzer states: 
Payday borrowers are not destitute, as very poor individuals 
generally fail to meet the bank account ownership and employment 
requirements of lenders. In surveys of payday borrowers, the vast 
majority of respondents report family income between $15,000 and 
$50,000, while only seven percent of borrowers report family incomes 
below $15,000.  
Id. 
 115. Nonbusiness bankruptcy filings were 2,039,214 in the twelve-month 
period that ended December 31, 2005. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. CTS., TABLE F-2: 
U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS–BUSINESS AND NON-BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY CASES 
COMMENCED BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-MONTH 
PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2005, (2005), available at http://www. 
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2005/
dec05/F02dec05.pdf. Then, nonbusiness bankruptcy filings fell to 597,965 in the 
twelve-month period that ended December 31, 2006. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. CTS., 
TABLE F-2: U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS–BUSINESS AND NON-BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY 
CASES COMMENCED BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-
MONTH PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2006, (2006), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudi
ciary/2006/dec06/F02Dec06.pdf. 
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that the average attorneys’ fees for the simplest form of bankruptcy 
(Chapter 7) increased by 51% percent,116 and this may have a 
disproportionate effect on lower-income or minority groups if these 
groups are more cash constrained. Precisely which groups would be 
most affected is, however, theoretically ambiguous because the 
poorest debtors may have already found bankruptcy to be too 
expensive. One existing empirical paper implies that this theoretical 
effect may have been practically insignificant. Elizabeth Warren 
and her co-authors searched the bankruptcy records and found that 
“those who filed in 2007 largely have the same income profile as 
those who filed in 2001”;117 they did not find evidence suggesting 
that the reforms had a disproportionate effect on lower-income 
households. I still control for a possible disparate effect by 
interacting a dummy variable that equals after BAPCPA took effect 
(BAPCPAi,t) with the same variables used to interact with payday 
lending (minority, military populations, and income). 
Table 1 presents summary statistics and Table 2 presents the 
results. Although my focus is on payday lending, it is worth pausing 
to note that the coefficients on unemployment take the expected 
sign and are statistically significant. However, the coefficient on 
exemptions is not statistically significant. This is roughly consistent 
with prior literature, which fails to show a robust connection 
between property exemptions and the filing rate.118 It is also worth 
noting that the regressions suggest that the effect of the 2005 
bankruptcy reforms may have varied significantly by county. In 
particular, the reforms seem to have had the greatest effect in 
counties in which a large percentage of households earn between 
$15,000 and $50,000. 
                                                                                                     
 116. See U.S. GOV’T  ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 99, at 21 (“Based on 
our sample of bankruptcy files, we estimate that the average attorney fee for a 
Chapter 7 case has increased roughly 50 percent since the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act.”). 
 117. See Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An 
Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 353 (2008) (“The 
data indicate that those who filed in 2007 largely have the same income profile 
as those who filed in 2001 . . . .”). The authors of this study stressed the absence 
of a change in the number of high-income filers rather than the absence of low-
income filers. Id. 
 118. See, e.g., Richard Hynes & Eric Posner, The Law and Economics of 
Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 168 (2002) (surveying the literature). 
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The regressions presented in Table 2 do not provide 
overwhelming support for either side of the debate, but they are 
more consistent with the beneficial view of payday lending than the 
debt–trap hypothesis. The beneficial view of payday lending predicts 
that legalization should cause a decrease in bankruptcy filings, and 
that this decrease should be more pronounced in areas where 
payday lenders choose to locate—areas with large military, 
minority, and moderate-income populations. The debt–trap 
hypothesis predicts the opposite—legalization should increase 
bankruptcy filings, and this increase should be more pronounced in 
areas with large military, minority, and moderate income 
populations. The regression that excludes all interactions (Column 1 
of Table 2A) does estimate a positive effect on the bankruptcy filing 
rate, but this estimate is not statistically significant. From the 
perspective of the debt–trap hypothesis, all of the interaction terms 
have the wrong sign. Although the coefficients on the interactions 
between payday lending and moderate income and minority 
population variables are not statistically significant, the coefficients 
on the interaction with the percentage of the workforce in the 
military are negative and statistically significant. The signs of the 
interaction terms lend some support to the beneficial view of payday 
lending. However, to make the claim that the legalization of payday 
lending decreases bankruptcy filings in areas with large military 
populations, one must consider the coefficients on Paydayi,t-1,  
Paydayi,t-1*militaryi, and Paydayi,t-1*(militaryi)2. Column 5 estimates 
that legalization reduces bankruptcy filings in counties in which the 
percentage of the workforce is between 2% and 21%. Only five of the 
3,109 counties for which I have data have military populations that 
account for more than 21% of the workforce, and only one of these 
counties has a population that exceeds 100,000.119 If a county’s 
workforce were 5% military, the number of nonbusiness bankruptcy 
filings per 100,000 would fall by between 54% and 87% (12%–19%) 
after the legalization of payday lending.  
Table 2B shows that the results are fairly robust against 
alternative specifications. Only the coefficients on the interaction 
between payday lending and military employment are consistently 
                                                                                                     
 119. These counties are Chattahoochee, GA (population of 14,990, 60.3%), 
Liberty, GA (population of 61,448, 27.8%), Pulaski, MO (population of 41,712, 
26.9%), Onslow, NC (population of 149,774, 28.2%), and Coryell, TX (population 
of 75,010, 23.9%). 
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significant. The first Column of Table 2B demonstrates that basic 
results continue to hold when one examines the log of the filing rate. 
Extremely large counties can have substantial intracounty 
diversity, and extremely small counties may have too few residents 
to yield reliable results. Column 1 therefore excludes counties with 
year 2000 populations that exceed 1,000,000 or fall below 10,000; 
the results remain largely the same. Military families may also be 
unusually reluctant to file for bankruptcy; perhaps they are simply 
more willing to endure the financial distress caused by payday 
lending without filing. However, the results do not materially 
change if I reduce the population of each county by the percentage of 
the workforce that is in the military (Column 3). The bankruptcy 
reforms of 2005 had a profound effect on bankruptcy practice,120 and 
the interaction variables and fixed-year effects may not adequately 
control for these changes. Column 4 therefore excludes all data from 
after 2004. This exclusion has the added benefit of excluding any 
effects of the 2007 federal law that prohibits high-interest loans to 
military personnel.121 The coefficient on the interaction between 
payday lending and the military population does fall, but it remains 
negative and significant at the 11% level.122 Column 5 allows for 
state-specific trends in the bankruptcy filing rate and, again, the 
basic results do not change. Columns 6 and 7 look only at Chapter 7 
filings, and Columns 8 and 9 look only at Chapter 13 filings. It is 
only if one restricts attention to Chapter 13 filings that the 
interaction between payday lending and the military population 
loses its significance. 
Table 2C examines the interaction between the legalization of 
payday lending, the crime rate, and the number of eviction suits. 
The results are, again, more consistent with the beneficial view of 
payday lending. The basic specifications suggest that the crime rate 
(measured by all property crimes, burglary, and larceny) tends to 
fall after the legalization of payday lending. However, we should 
expect any effect from the legalization of payday lending to be most 
                                                                                                     
 120. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing how nonbusiness 
bankruptcy filings fell dramatically after the 2005 bankruptcy reforms). 
 121. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (describing the 2007 federal 
law prohibiting high-interest loans to military personnel). 
 122. Because of the negative (but statistically insignificant) coefficient on 
payday lending alone, Column 4 predicts a negative effect on payday lending 
over a larger range of military employment—up to about 31%. 
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concentrated where these lenders tend to locate, and most of the 
interaction terms are statistically insignificant. Only the interaction 
between the legalization of payday lending and the minority 
population is statistically significant, and this is only true for the 
regression using burglary as the dependent variable. While these 
regressions are more consistent with the beneficial view of payday 
lending, they provide only weak support for this view. 
B. The End of the Rent-a-Charter Era 
Although the state-law analysis provides little support for the 
debt–trap hypothesis,123 this may be due to the difficulty of 
determining the presence of payday lending. Some states that 
technically prohibited payday lending may have been unwilling to 
devote the resources necessary to enforce the law. Other states may 
have wanted to enforce the law but were unable to do so due to the 
ability of payday lenders to partner with out-of-state banks.124  
Finally, states that expect the level of financial distress to increase 
due to other factors may be less likely to approve payday lending out 
of a fear that their citizens would be particularly vulnerable. This 
would bias the results against the debt–trap hypothesis. Of course, 
states that expect an increase in financial distress due to other 
factors may be more likely to approve payday lending to increase the 
availability of credit. This could bias the results in favor of the debt–
trap hypothesis; the net direction of the bias is unknown. 
This subpart presents the results of an alternative test that is 
less sensitive to these problems. Specifically, it looks to the FDIC 
regulatory changes that effectively eliminated the rent-a-charter 
era.125  This change should have had very little effect in states that 
allowed payday lending or in states, such as New York, that 
somehow managed to enforce their payday lending laws before the 
                                                                                                     
 123. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the debt–trap 
hypothesis and explaining its rationale). 
 124. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 872 (“During the early years of 
this decade . . . many banks partnered with large national providers so that 
those providers could use the federal preemptive shelter available to the banks 
to operate programs that otherwise would have violated state usury laws.”). 
 125. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text (discussing the end of 
the rent-a-charter era.) 
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change.126 This test solves the problem created by the potential 
effect of financial distress on the choice of payday lending 
regulation, but it does so at the cost of statistical power. I exclude 
counties in states that changed their laws regulating payday 
lending during the window studied. I begin my window in 2003 to 
reduce the number of states lost. The counties in North Carolina 
and Pennsylvania are my treated observations.127 Because this test 
focuses on changes in the laws of just two states, there is more of a 
risk that the results could be due to omitted variables. 
The FDIC action should have had an effect similar to the 
prohibition of payday lending. To avoid confusion about the meaning 
of the sign of a variable, I define FDIC to be a dummy variable equal 
to zero if the FDIC action affected a state in a given year; otherwise, 
it is equal to one. If payday lending reduces financial distress, the 
coefficients on FDIC and the interactions with military and minority 
populations should be negative (as with prior regressions). The 
FDIC changes should have reduced financial distress in the treated 
states, and this effect should have been most pronounced in counties 
with large military and minority populations.  
Table 3 examines changes in the bankruptcy filing rate, and the 
results do not offer significant support for either the beneficial or the 
detrimental view of payday lending. The most basic specification 
(Column 1 of Table 3A) once again does not yield a statistically 
significant estimate of the effect of the legalization of payday 
lending on bankruptcy filings. Unlike the results of the tests based 
on changes in state law (Table 2), the coefficients on the interaction 
between payday lending and large military and minority 
populations are positive rather than negative. However, only 
military or minority interaction coefficients in Columns 1, 3, and 5 
of Table 3B are statistically significant, and none of the military or 
minority interaction coefficients in Table 3A are statistically 
significant. In other words, some of the regressions suggest that the 
                                                                                                     
 126. See id. at 880 (finding that “New York has managed to exclude payday 
lenders . . . through conspicuously aggressive enforcement” of its payday lending 
laws). 
 127. Although payday lending has always been illegal in Georgia, the 
Georgia legislature made payday lending a felony in May of 2004. See GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-17-2(d) (2011). I exclude Georgia as a state that changed its laws on 
payday lending during the relevant period. The results are not very different if 
one includes Georgia, although a few more coefficients are statistically 
significant.  
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FDIC’s prohibition on the rent-a-charter arrangement reduced 
bankruptcies in counties with large military or minority populations 
relative to other counties within the state, but this result does not 
hold in most specifications. Moreover, four specifications suggest 
that the FDIC action prohibiting the rent-a-charter arrangements 
actually increased the number of bankruptcies in areas in which a 
large percentage of households earn between $15,000 and $50,000—
the very households that are likely to frequent payday lenders.128 
The regressions using the crime rate or the eviction rate (Table 
3C) do not offer clear support for either side in the debate, but they 
are once again more consistent with the beneficial view of payday 
lending. Only the larceny-rate regression suggests an increase in 
the relative crime rate in states affected by the FDIC’s change, 
though the total property crime rate comes close to significance at 
the 10% level. Each regression that includes an interaction term 
suggests that the change in the crime rate was more pronounced in 
areas with large military or minority populations. 
V. Conclusion 
The recent debates over payday lending are the latest 
installment in a centuries-old conflict over high-interest loans. By 
now, the theoretical arguments are clearly defined. Those who 
oppose regulation cite the freedom of contract129 or claim that credit 
can help smooth consumption and mitigate income and expense 
shocks.130 Those who support regulation claim that high-interest 
loans ensnare consumers in a debt trap and increase financial 
                                                                                                     
 128. See JOHN P. CASKEY, THE ECONOMICS OF PAYDAY LENDING 2 (2002) 
(“Surveys of payday loan customers find that . . . about half of the customers 
reported household incomes of between $25,000 and $50,000. The remaining 
customers were almost equally divided between those with household incomes 
under $25,000 and those with incomes over $50,000.”). 
 129. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics and Regulation of Bank Overdraft 
Protection 32–33 (Mercatus Ctr. at George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 11-
41, 2011), available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/ 
Overdraft_Protection_Zywicki10.24.11.pdf (arguing that “freedom of contract is 
most likely more efficient than regulation” to protect consumers from  high-
interest payday loans). 
 130. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text (referencing and 
discussing scholarly works that propound the benefits of payday lending). 
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hardship.131 Still others maintain that regulation is likely to be 
ineffective because consumers and lenders will find ways to evade 
the law.132 Given the theoretical ambiguity, empirical tests can play 
an important role in guiding policymakers. Unfortunately, the 
existing empirical tests are inconclusive. Some studies find that 
payday loans increase signs of financial distress, some find that they 
reduce signs of distress, and still others fail to find a statistically 
significant effect.133 
This Article uses the claim that payday lenders target military 
and minority populations to test the relationship between payday 
lending and evidence of financial hardship. The results are similarly 
mixed. Consistent with the beneficial view of payday lending, this 
Article finds that as states legalize payday lending the bankruptcy 
filing rate tends to fall in counties with large military populations. 
While this result is robust against a variety of alternative 
specifications, I failed to find a statistically significant effect in areas 
with large minority populations. 
I supplement this first test with another that examines the 
effect of the FDIC’s efforts to end the partnership between banks 
and payday lenders in 2005.134 This move should have had the effect 
of banning payday lending in some states where payday lending was 
otherwise legal. These results provide less support for the beneficial 
view of payday lending, but they do not support the debt–trap 
hypothesis either. On balance, the results do not suggest that the 
FDIC’s reform caused a statistically significant change in 
bankruptcy filing rates in counties with large military or minority 
populations.  
                                                                                                     
 131. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the debt–trap 
hypothesis and explaining its rationale). 
 132. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text (describing how some 
scholars take an agnostic view of payday lending and arguing that both lenders 
and consumers find ways to evade payday lending laws). 
 133. See supra notes 55–77 and accompanying text (discussing prior 
empirical research on payday lending and the policy perspectives that each 
supports). 
 134. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of 
the FDIC’s 2005 regulatory efforts to end the partnerships between banks and 
payday lenders). 
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Tables 
Table 1: Summary Statistics (Weighted by County Population in 2000) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Payday: One if payday lending legal in prior year 
(1998–2009) 40,417 0.59 0.49 
Nonbusiness bankruptcies per 100,000 37,296 455 249 
Chapter 7 nonbusiness bankruptcies per 100,000 37,296 323 181 
Chapter 13 bankruptcies per 100,000 37,296 131 140 
Property crime arrests per 100,000 40,411 535 311 
Burglary arrests per 100,000 40,411 96 66 
Larceny arrests per 100,000 40,411 389 247 
Motor vehicle theft arrests per 100,000 40,411 45 44 
Landlord tenant suits in lower court per 100,000 1,701 3,032 6,208 
Unemployment rate in prior year 34,174 5.00 1.84 
Exemptions: Sum of homestead and personal 
property exemptions available to married couples in 
tens of thousands of 2008 dollars with caps on 
unlimited exemptions 49,278 16.81 20.41 
Military: military as percent of civilian and 
government workforce 3,109 0.53 1.83 
Minority: Nonwhite as percent of population 3,109 24.9 17.1 
Inc.<15: percent of households with income less than
$15,000 in 1999 3,109 16 6 
Inc.15–50: percent with income between $15,000 and 
$50,000 3,109 42 7 
Inc.>50: percent with income greater than $50,000 3,109 42 12 
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Table 2A: Bankruptcy Filing Rate after Legalization of Payday Lending135 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

































Payday*Inc.<15     0.59 (0.69) 
Payday*Inc.15–50     -0.04 (0.99) 
























BAPCPA*Inc.<15     3.159
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(0.08) 











































Observations 37,270 37,270 37,270 37,270 37,270 
R-Sq. 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.67 
No. of Ctycode 3,107 3,107 3,107 3,107 3,107 
 
  
                                                                                                     
 135. The dependent variable is all nonbusiness bankruptcies per 100,000 
population. All regressions have 3,107 county codes and 37,270 observations.  
All regressions included fixed-year effects and fixed-county effects. Standard 
errors are clustered by state. Robust p values are in parentheses. * p<0.05, + 
p<0.1. 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                                                                     
 136. The dependent variable in Column 1 uses the log of the bankruptcy filing 
rate. Column 2 excludes counties with a population in the year 2000 that was either 
greater than 1,000,000 or less than 10,000. Column 3 multiplies the bankruptcy 
filing rate by the percent of employment that is nonmilitary. Column 4 uses only 
data from before 2005. Column 5 includes state-specific trends as explanatory 
variables. Columns 6 and 7 examine the Chapter 7 filing rate and Columns 8 and 9 
examine the Chapter 13 filing rate. All regressions included fixed-year effects and 
fixed-county effects as well as the unemployment rate, exemptions, and the square 
of the unemployment rate and exemptions. Regressions that include data from 2005 
and after include interactions with BAPCPA. Standard errors are clustered by 
county. Robust p values are in parentheses. * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                                                                     
 137. All dependent variables are expressed per 100,000 population. All 
regressions included fixed-year effects, fixed-county effects, the unemployment 
rate and the square of the unemployment rate, and interactions with BAPCPA. 
Standard errors are clustered by county. Robust p values are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
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Table 3A: Bankruptcy Filing Rate After FDIC’s Act to End “Rent-A-Charter” Era138 














































Observations 18,095 18,095 18,095 18,095 18,095 
R-squared 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.77 0.77 
No. of Ctycode 2,587 2,587 2,587 2,587 2,587 
 
  
                                                                                                     
 138. The dependent variable is all nonbusiness bankruptcies per 100,000 
population. All regressions included fixed-year effects, fixed-county effects, the 
unemployment rate, exemptions, the square of the unemployment rate and 
exemptions, and interactions with BAPCPA. Standard errors are clustered by 
state. Robust p values are in parentheses. * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
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Table 3B: Bankruptcy Filings After FDIC’s Act to End “Rent-A-Charter” Era139 


























































































Observations 18,981 13,601 19,208 18,095 18,095 19,208 19,208 
R-Squared 0.861 0.768 0.817 0.763 0.793 0.298 0.343 
No. of Ctycode 2,745 1,945 2,746 2,587 2,587 2,746 2,746 
 
  
                                                                                                     
 139. The dependent variable in Column 1 uses the log of the bankruptcy 
filing rate. Column 2 excludes counties with a population in the year 2000 that 
was either greater than 1,000,000 or less than 10,000. Column 3 includes state-
specific trends as explanatory variables. Column 4 and 5 examine the Chapter 7 
filing rate and Column 6 and 7 examine the Chapter 13 filing rate. All 
regressions included fixed-year effects and fixed-county effects as well as the 
unemployment rate, exemptions, and the square of the unemployment rate and 
exemptions. Standard errors are clustered by county. Robust p values are in 
parentheses. * p<0.05, + p<0.1.  






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                                                                     
 140. All dependent variables are expressed per 100,000 population. All 
regressions included fixed-year effects, fixed-county effects, the unemployment 
rate and the square of the unemployment rate, and interactions with BAPCPA. 
Standard errors are clustered by county. Robust p values in parentheses. * 
p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
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Table 4: State Laws on Payday Lending 
State Legal in Period Citation 
AL 6/30/2003 ALA. CODE § 5-18A-1 et seq. (2011). 
AK 1/1/2005 ALASKA STAT. § 06.50.400 (2011) 
AZ 4/1/2000–
7/1/2010 




ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-52-101 et seq. (2011); ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. 
XIX, § 13 (repealed 2011); 
http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/elements/www.payday 
loaninfo.org/File/08_07_attorney_general.pdf. 
CA 1/1/1997 CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 23000–23106 (2011). 
CO 7/1/2000 COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-101 (2011). 
CT Never CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36A-563 (2011). 
DE Always Delaware enacted licensing legislation effective 7/9/2002. DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 5, §§ 2227 et seq., 2744 (2011). I code Delaware as always 
allowing payday lending due to an alleged lack of effective usury 
limits on small loans. 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf. 
FL Always FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.401 et seq. (2011); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 
69V-560.901 et seq. (2011). I code Florida as always allowing payday 
lending because prior law did allow check cashers to charge fees for 
cashing postdated checks. 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf. 
GA Never Though payday lending has always been illegal in Georgia, the state 
did pass legislation effective in May of 2004 that made the practice a 
felony. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-17-1 to -10 (2011). 
HI 7/1/1999 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480F-1 et seq. (2011). 
ID Always Idaho enacted legislation effective 7/1/2003. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-
46-401 et seq. (2011). I code Idaho as always allowing payday lending 
due to an alleged lack of effective usury limits on small loans. 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf. 
IL Always Illinois enacted legislation effective 12/6/2005. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 122/1-1 et seq. (2011). I code Illinois as always allowing payday 
lending due to an alleged lack of effective usury limits on small loans. 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf. 
IN Always Ind. Code Ann. § 24-4.5-7-101 et seq. (effective 3/14/2002).  I code 
Indiana as always allowing payday lending because prior law allowed 
the lender to assess minimum fees of $33. 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf. 
IA Always IOWA CODE ANN. § 533D.1 et seq. (2011). 
KS Always KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16A-2-404 (2011). 
KY Always KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16A-2-404 (2011). 
LA 8/15/1997 Act of June 11, 1997, no. 41, § 1, 1997 La. Acts 1, 132, repealed by Act 
of July 12, 1999, no. 1315, ch. 2-A, 1999 La. Acts 2671, 3529; LA. 
CONST. of 1974, art. III, § 19. 
ME Never ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-a, § 2-401 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
32, § 6138 (2011). 
MD Never MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-306(a)(2)(i) (2011). 
MA Never MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 96 (2011). 
MI 11/28/2005 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 487.2121 et seq. (2011). 
MN Always legal MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.60 (2011). 
MS 7/1/1998 MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-67-501 et seq. (2011). 
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State Legal in Period Citation 
MO Always legal MO. ANN. STAT. § 408.500 et seq. (2011); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, 
§ 140-11.010 et seq. (2011). 
MT Always legal MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-701 et seq. (2011). I code Montana as always 
allowing payday lending due to an alleged lack of effective usury 
limits on small loans. 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf. 
NE Always legal NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-904 (2011). 
NV 7/1/1998 NEV. REV. STAT. § 604.010 et seq. (2010), repealed by NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 604A.010 et seq. (2010). 
NH 1/1/2000–
1/1/2009 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 399-A:1 et seq. (2011). 
NJ Never N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-19 (2011). 
NM Always legal N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-33 (2011). I code New Mexico as always 
allowing payday lending due to an alleged lack of effective usury 
limits on small loans. 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf. 
NY Always illegal N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (2011). 
NC 10/1/1997–
8/31/1997 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-281 (2011), amended by Act of July 31, 2001, ch. 
323, § 1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 1, 960 (expired 2001). 
ND 4/19/2001 N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-08-01 et seq. (2011), amended by Act of Apr. 11, 
2005, ch. 127, 2005 N.D. Laws 1, 661. 
OH 9/1/2008 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.35 et seq. (repealed 2008). 
OK 9/1/2003 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 3101 et seq. (2011). 
OR Prohibited 
7/1/2007 
OR. REV. STAT. § 725.625 (2011), repealed by Act of June 26, 2007, ch. 
603, § 11, 2007 Or. Laws 993, 1569 (2007). 
PA Never 7 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6213 (2011). 
RI 7/1/2001 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 19-14.4-1, -4 (2011), amended by Act of July 9, 
2005, ch. 230, § 1, 2005 R.I. Pub. Laws 755, 1302. 
SC 6/11/1998 S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-39-110 et seq. (2011). 
SD Always S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-4-36 et seq. (2011). I code South Dakota as 
always allowing payday lending due to a lack of an effective small 
loan usury cap. http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf 
TN 10/1/1997 TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-101 et seq. (2011); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 
0180-28-.01 (2011). 
TX 9/1/1997 TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.251 et seq. (2011). Industry trade groups 
list Texas as having unfavorable payday lending laws, but consumer 
advocacy groups list Texas as having laws that are too favorable to 
payday lending. The results are robust against a recoding of Texas as 
prohibiting payday lending. 
UT Always Utah enacted payday lending legislation effective 5/3/1999. UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 7-23-101 et seq. (2011). I code Utah as always allowing 
payday lending due to a lack of effective usury laws. 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf. 
VT Never VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 41a (2011). 
VA 7/1/2002 VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1800 et seq. (2011). 
WA Always WASH. REV. CODE § 31.45.010 et seq. (2011). 
WV Never W. VA. CODE § 46A-4-107(2) (2011). 
WI Always WIS. STAT. §§ 138.04, .05 (2011). 
WY 7/1/1996 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-362 et seq. (2011). 
 
